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Abstract 
Following a political communications framework can provide useful critical understanding of the 
international philanthropic industries beyond the more traditional approaches of political economy, 
anthropology and postcolonial studies. To this end, this chapter frames foreign aid and development 
assistance through theories of soft power, arguing that these activities are acts of public diplomacy 
and thereby conducive to the source government’s power accumulation motive. This is open to 
some contest across the literature as research framed under international political economy or 
social anthropology often assumes that international power redistribution is the primary motive. 
Analysis of these programmes under the soft power framework allows for the discussion of the 
multitude of audiences that the activities engage with beyond the direct recipients of assistance as 
part of the power accumulation precedent. The chapter will hereby discuss the role of morality and 
compassion within the policy-making process, which leads to the question of whether we should 
really be considering whether most aid and development is in fact meant to work rather than the 
more popular query of why so much of it does not work. 
Introduction 
The propaganda that surrounds foreign aid describes its altruistic and compassionate motives. 
However, far from any empathetic or developmental intent, foreign aid is primarily motivated by the 
consolidation of the power status of the source as usurper and the recipient as usurped. To this end, 
an understanding of foreign aid and development assistance through the prism of soft power –  the 
term coined by Joseph Nye (see 2004) at the end of the Cold War to describe when power in 
international politics is achieved through attraction rather than coercion or persuasion – is useful to 
wider understanding of the grand purpose of these industries. At the crux of this paper then is an 
attempt to provide an explanation for why so-called foreign aid and development assistance does 
not work. If, by ‘work’, it is meant that programmes facilitated by international governmental actors 
reduce extreme poverty, relieve destitution, improve educational attainment, deliver vital skills 
training, while at the same time respecting aspects of culture, human movement and the 
environment, then foreign aid and development assistance has been a catastrophic failure as it has 
made no contribution to a more egalitarian and fairer world that purports to be its motivation. To 
this end, the question may be better phrased as ‘is foreign aid meant to work?’ because its 
perpetuation seems to be based on it satisfying alternative power ambitions to those that it claims.  
The nineteenth century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1995) argued that compassion 
should be the only motivation if an action is to be considered as philanthropy. As such, the foreign 
aid industries communicate from a disingenuous platform as they primarily exist to fulfil the power 
ambitions of the source or self-styled ‘donor’ state. We understand this because, as Arturo Escobar 
(1995: 21) explains in jest, the poverty of certain parts of the world appears to have been 
‘discovered’ after World War II when the narrative surrounding the planet’s poorest people became 
one of deliverance from their destitution. It was as though the former colonial exploiters had 
suddenly discovered their moral compass. To this end, the post-war growth of the foreign aid 
industries was part of attempts to ensure political and economic continuity in the postcolonial era 
and was only interested in poverty alleviation to the extent that it benefited the major powers as 
they continued their exploitation of these territories.  
The key argument made by this chapter is that communications analysis of foreign aid can provide 
an alternative framework to those more commonly used from political economy, anthropology or 
postcolonial studies, and that this may assist with the repositioning of wider questions concerning 
development studies generally. As such, this chapter will discuss foreign aid as acts of public 
diplomacy: a distinct political communications terminology referring to attempts made by 
governments to engage with foreign publics as befitting strategic goals. The intent of these activities 
is normally the generation soft power for, or the bestowment of attractiveness upon, the source of 
these communications. To be clear therefore, the mechanisms of foreign aid tacitly communicate 
messages of virtuosity regarding the source to numerous domestic and international audiences. 
Thus, while public diplomacy is predominantly considered to have international priorities, it can also 
be linked to governmental priorities concerning its domestic public. Beyond this, foreign aid under a 
public diplomacy framework also forms part of governmental attempts to demonstrate congruence 
with prevailing international ideological norms and deontological guidelines regarding the 
responsible behaviour of wealth states. In today’s case this involves the propagation that supposed 
international philanthropy can be an adequate counterweight to the acceleration in global inequality 
that has been the result of neoliberalism. However, much like other activities that are propagated as 
philanthropy under this ideology, foreign aid and development assistance have little intent to offer 
social justice and should always be considered part of the exploitation rather than any offset against 
it.  
Herein lies one of the fundamental limitations of democracy: that it cannot deliver meaningful 
change, partly because group consensus almost always produces an egotistical outcome (see 
Niebuhr, 1932). For example, democracy is ill-equipped to reverse or stifle the effects of climate 
change because its institutions refuse to enforce the necessary restrictions on the consumptions of 
the electorate lest the leadership become unpopular. Democracy involves the art of dream selling 
and the limitation of toil, and this rarely involves a utopia of human reintegration with the natural 
world. Thus, political leaders who fail to adequately nourish the collective ego of the electorate 
normally have short-lived political careers. Consequently, governments maintain the fiction that 
foreign aid is motivated by philanthropic rather than strategic and economic interests because this 
assists with the nourishment of a domestic collective ego that the country and its citizens make a 
positive contribution to the planet beyond consumption of its resources. It then gains uncritical 
support from many echelons of the public who misguidedly support foreign aid as a form of state 
charity because this feeds the individual ego’s desire to perceive oneself as virtuous within the 
prevailing ideology. However, this is a subconscious self-deception that has been incentivised by 
ideological hoaxing seeking to create feelings of worthiness within the consumer that lead to 
optimal consumption. As such, worthiness is normally maintained in one of two ways under these 
conditions: either through forms of collective or individual voluntary penance that are paid at the 
point of transaction to permit a guiltfree continuation of a supposedly virtuous existence of 
inconsequential behaviour; or in the form of foreign aid, wherein a government claims that taxation 
monies are assisting the world’s poor who suffer misfortune rather than the effects of an organised 
system of denial. These propagandas essentially seek to maintain capitalism’s profit-making 
imperative by detaching the consumer experience from the reality of its implications on the world’s 
poor, and indeed the environment, and keeps hidden that a reduction in consumption would assist 
both the balance of humans with the planetary ecosystem, while also improving the relations of 
humans with other humans.  
Much of the philanthropic industries then exist in a doublespeak world reminiscent of George 
Orwell’s classic dystopian novel 1984. Orwell (1949) provides the adage of the Ministry of Peace, 
which makes war; the Ministry of Truth, which lies; the Ministry of Love, which tortures; and the 
Ministry of Plenty, which starves. Orwell argued that these acts of doublespeak are essentially 
attempts by the state to misconstrue the consciousness of the people. To this end, much like our 
Ministries of Defence are more concerned with outward aggression, it can be argued that the use of 
words like ‘aid’, ‘development’, ‘assistance’ and the notion of ‘donors’ and ‘donations’ are Orwellian-
style propaganda. The industry communicates in a philanthropic language using terms like ‘support’, 
‘dignity’, ‘compassion’, ‘capacity’ and the ‘alleviation of hardship’. However, perhaps rather than 
being called the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the British 
Department for International Development (DfID) it would be more accurate to call them Agencies or 
Departments for International Diminution.  
The remainder of this chapter has been split into three subsections. The first provides a wider 
academic discussion of the compatibility of morality with the foreign policy process. This is 
important because it helps to frame the extent to which foreign aid misrepresents itself as an act of 
state philanthropy. The chapter will then provide a specific discussion of soft power and public 
diplomacy within the context of development studies. Finally, the chapter will provide some 
concluding remarks concerning foreign aid and development and wider positions regarding 
prevailing ideology and the propaganda that justifies itself.  
 
Morality and Foreign Policy 
The eighteenth-century philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote in The Social Contract that, 
Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must 
conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men. (Rousseau, 
1993: 185) 
These ‘conventions’ may pose as moral authority. However, they are upheld for the primary purpose 
of the maintenance of power structures by those who propagate their value. Transferred to 
international politics then, it can be argued that no state has entitlement to its international power. 
As a result, states strategically communicate with domestic and international audiences in an 
attempt at orchestrating value judgments about themselves that serve their power ambitions. To 
this end, public diplomacy activities form part of the alibi that states propagate in an attempt at 
convincing others of their power ambitions despite a lack of legal or moral entitlement therewith. 
Indeed, if power was guaranteed then there would be little need for these strategic 
communications. As such, public diplomacy is often the ground on which governments propagate an 
ethical compliance of sorts with prevailing international norms. This is notwithstanding the 
authenticity of these communications as it is power rather than compliance that is their primary 
objective. 
On the role of morality in foreign policy then, Nicholas Spykman has argued that,  
The statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with values of justice, 
fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the 
power objective. They can be used instrumentally as moral justification for the power quest, 
but they must be discarded the moment their application brings weakness. The search for 
power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate 
the attainment of power. (Spykman, 1942: 18) 
Henceforth, the role of the state in international affairs is always, as Spykman says, to ‘facilitate the 
attainment of power’, with the harbouring of any contrary opinions only resulting in eventual 
disappointment. Accordingly, the moral accompaniment to power ambitions is delivered explicitly 
and implicitly through communications activities like public diplomacy, which includes, but is not 
limited to, international broadcasting, cultural diplomacy, education and knowledge exchange, 
endorsements of other governments, state visits, gestures of goodwill, media and public relations, 
and foreign aid and development assistance. However, all of these activities have the potential to 
become redundant if they are deemed to be unimportant or even detrimental to the power quest. 
This includes all foreign aid. Indeed, foreign aid’s usefulness to the power equation is its association 
with the philanthropy that forms a key part of the prevailing neoliberal ideology’s moral justification 
of itself. In short, neoliberalism’s exploitation is propagated as being acceptable as long as a remedy 
for the suffering that it induces is also provided in some measure. However, this industry, indeed 
most supposedly charitable acts under neoliberalism, are motivated not by collective compassion 
but by ego. In short, many of those engaged in these industries are at least partly motivated by the 
self-confirmation of virtuosity that such a career brings. Additionally, positive external 
acknowledgement may also be sought for their actions, and offence may be taken if the person 
being assisted does not bestow an expected level of gratitude. Alternatively, recognition is sought 
for charitable acts as part of the formation of public persona, now most commonly pursued on social 
media platforms.  
Therefore, neoliberalism has conveniently created a multibillion dollar foreign aid and development 
industry ready to dispense the advocated prescription and provide some outlet for the ego that 
capitalism prioritises over compassion. In many ways, therefore, foreign aid resembles a global form 
of the medical illness Munchausen’s by Proxy where sickness is induced in a person by a caregiver in 
order that attention be drawn to themselves. This rather uncomfortable analogy is at the crux of the 
conceptualisation of foreign aid as public diplomacy that we will returned to later in the chapter.  
The writings of the Italian philosopher and political prisoner Antonio Gramsci (1891 – 1937) have 
been used in many contexts related to the study of power and communications. Gramsci wrote the 
following on the uses of morality and culture by the powerful in their pursuit of authority: 
In my opinion, the most reasonable and concrete thing that can be said about the ethical 
and cultural state is this: every state is ethical in as much as one of its most important 
functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, 
a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces of development, 
and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. The school as a positive educative function, 
and the courts as a repressive and negative educative function, are the most important state 
activities in this sense: but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and 
activities tend to the same end – initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the 
political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes. (Gramsci, cited in Forgacs, 1988: 234) 
Thus, for Gramsci, whatever that ‘particular cultural and moral level’ ought to be for those within 
and beyond the powerful state was decided by whatever the forces of production require it to be. To 
this end, the landscape of foreign aid at a given time can be linked to the requirements of the means 
of production through its delivery of a cultural or moral authority that befits the priorities of the 
prevailing world system and manufactures a sense of power by attraction under the ideological 
guise. To this end, the key to the maintenance of hegemonic power was through what Gramsci 
called the ‘guardians’ of any society. Most likely inspired by Plato’s The Republic, Gramsci’s 
guardians essentially amounted to intellectuals whose moral leadership is admired by society and 
who gain credibility and authority through the perception that they act as intermediaries between 
the powerful and the suppressed. Think: celebrity endorsement of charities. Gramsci concluded that 
this is a fabrication as the intellectuals seek the maintenance of at least a semblance of the power 
status quo. Indeed, they would not be conferred as guardians if they sought anything more radical or 
revolutionary.  
This position is articulated well by the American ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr who wrote that,  
No society has ever achieved peace without incorporating injustice into its harmony.  Those 
who would eliminate the injustice are therefore always placed at the moral disadvantage of 
imperilling its peace. […] This passion for peace need not always be consciously dishonest. 
Since those who hold special privileges in society are naturally inclined to regard their 
privileges as their rights and to be unmindful of the effects of inequality upon the 
underprivileged […]. (Niebuhr, 1932: 78) 
Thus, those who are held to be guardians of a community will not be advocates of any anarchy, false 
or otherwise. Niebuhr continues: 
The moral attitudes of dominant and privileged groups are characterised by universal self-
deception and hypocrisy. The unconscious and conscious identification of their special 
interests with general interests and universal values, which we have noted in analysing 
national attitudes, is equally obvious in the attitude of classes. (Niebuhr, 1932: 72) 
This argument concerning the association between privileged class interests and supposed ‘universal 
values’ helps to explain the educational narrative of foreign aid and development assistance, which 
preaches that if only the world’s poor could become more efficient and learn from the developed 
nations then they would somehow ‘catch up’. However, this is propagated as part of the creation of 
attraction that the source seeks for itself as part of its soft power ambitions.  
The generation of attraction leads to the question of access to, and control of, cultural spaces and 
fora. In short, whose voices are heard, who is listened to, and who is marginalised, vilified or even 
absent altogether. The notion of cultural space, and its control, was discussed at length by the 
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre during the late twentieth century. Lefebvre’s (1991) explained 
how the narratives of cultural space embody future notions of utopia of the prevailing ideology at a 
given time. These narratives are the result of ‘knowledge’ that is propagated as objective, but which 
is framed by the means of production. Lefebvre (1991: 9) wrote that, “[t]his ideology carries no flag, 
and for those who accept the practice of which […] it is indistinguishable from knowledge.” It is also 
indistinguishable partly because the individual’s egotistical desire to believe in their own virtue and 
the validity of their life choices. This denial or repression is lived at such a level that various 
subconscious defence mechanisms are engaged so as not to encounter the discomfort brought by 
the realisation of contradiction. This critical path is also no doubt discouraged by the mass 
distractions that all ideologies employ to prevent the potential for cognitive dissonance within their 
advocates.  
In terms of foreign aid then, Foucault (1991) discussed the notion of the ‘humanitarian mode of 
power’ in which a subversive authority portrays themselves as the provider of solutions to prevalent 
social issues while simultaneously utilising natural resources and human labour to meet their own 
ends. Foucault discussed this within the context of the prison system and the notion of 
rehabilitation. However, the argument can also be used to explain foreign aid narratives. During the 
colonial period, for example, the notion of ‘civilising’ the ‘uncivilised’ to Western cultural standards 
became the popular moral justification that accompanied economic exploitation, and this has 
continued in the postcolonial period in practices of foreign aid and development assistance within 
the ‘catch up’ mentality. Foucault’s work on the dynamics of discourse and power in the 
representation of social reality also revealed the mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse 
produces permissible modes of being and thinking while placing other beyond the pale. This creates 
senses of what is to be revered and what is unattractive. Thus, the argument that foreign aid 
represents state philanthropy, rather than an essential part of the power accumulation strategy that 
dominates policy objectives, likely sits so safely within the perimeters of prevailing discourses that 
the majority of people consider it to be no argument at all.   
The great literary figure Oscar Wilde (1900: 2) once said that, “[…] the worst slave-owners were 
those who were kind to their slaves, and so prevented the horror of the system being realised by 
those who suffered from it.” To this end, therefore, in many ways foreign aid is an unsatisfactory 
stopgap that prevents its recipients from receiving social justice and perpetuates, even justifies, their 
exploitation. Some of those engaged in the industry may mean well. Particularly those on the ground 
performing its functions. However, they are ultimately misguided or self-deceiving because, far from 
any moral catalyst, foreign aid symbolises much of the alibi that this deeply unfair world system uses 
to preserve its legitimacy. 
 
Public Diplomacy, Soft Power and Foreign Aid 
Public diplomacy can be defined as the governmental act of attempting to communicate with foreign 
publics to assist the power ambitions of the source of these communications. These ambitions are 
always strategic and economic, such is the overlap between the motives, and involve efforts at 
engineering cognisant or incognisant positive value judgments about the source, and its domestic 
and international actions and intentions, in the hope that these transfer into social, economic and 
political gains. Thus, public diplomacy works well when it balances tendencies towards sharing, 
equality, understanding and connectedness with other humans, while also stimulating the ego which 
often prevents the enjoyment of a collective compassionate experience to any great extent. This 
represents public diplomacy’s exploitation of human dialectic for its own ends. As such, public 
diplomacy’s engagement with human tendencies towards compassion for others is one of the main 
reasons for the positivity and sometimes romanticism that can be found in much of its academic 
literature. However, its stimulation and incentivisation by the powerful for accumulative and 
conservative ends, much like foreign aid, ultimately results in the industry existing on a fallacy of 
compassionate authenticity.  
The terms public diplomacy and soft power are frequently found together in academic literature 
with the rationale for this usually that public diplomacy is concerned with the generation of soft 
power for the source of the communications. Consequently, an actor cannot ‘do’ soft power, so to 
speak, as soft power can only be bestowed upon an actor by another. Furthermore, soft power can 
be bestowed upon a benign actor who makes little purposeful or proactive attempt to improve their 
soft power status but simply acts in a way deemed to be attractive. Thus, soft power status can be 
achieved without engaging in public diplomacy activities. Finally, while it can be acknowledged that 
public diplomacy normally seeks to make the source more attractive, this is not a precondition. 
Indeed, public diplomacy activities have been known to present the source as less attractive to some 
groups as strategic objectives determine. For example, when seeking to deter some economic 
migrants or refugees from travelling to the source. 
Public diplomacy narratives and activities often epitomise the cultural and national identity of their 
source. To this end, public diplomacy often uses the knowledge capital of the source’s domestic 
public as part of the persona that it attempts to create in the international sphere. Thus, domestic 
publics can perform an informal ambassadorial role when public diplomacy activities become an 
international outlet for the skills of that group. This is particularly prominent when public diplomacy 
concerns foreign aid, development assistance and some forms of cultural diplomacy, which often 
seek to harness the talents, knowledge and emotions of the public. What is more, public diplomacy 
often seeks to massage the collective ego of the domestic public by linking to nationalist desires to 
believe in the positivity of one’s own country’s role in the international system and one’s individual 
contribution to it. It can also assist with community building at home.  
This domestic function of public diplomacy can be overlooked such is the focus of the literature on 
international communications. However, most governments considered it important that a country 
has a clear sense of its past, present and future and incentivises propaganda to induce this. To this 
end, most countries are founded on myths concerning the shared history of all echelons of society. 
These are propagandas designed to manufacture the obedience of those experiencing a power 
deficit and may involve the propagation of a glorious past involving the defeat of barbarous enemies 
who posed existential threats, a tragic past involving gallant defeat to external forces displaying 
immense brutality, or a past from which history has been reckoned with or learned from and from 
which the domestic public can now provide assistance to others around the world as befits public 
diplomacy priorities. 
As this author has argued in other publications (see Alexander, 2014a; 2014b and 2015) foreign aid 
and development assistance fit well within the remit of public diplomacy and soft power because it 
seeks to improve the attractiveness of the source within the minds of target domestic and 
international audiences, such is its positive propagation under prevailing ideology. This chapter has 
already discussed the notion of morality and foreign policy and this has provided a platform from 
which specific details of the audiences that foreign aid seeks to engage with can now be understood. 
This section will now discuss four specific audiences in turn. However, the political elite’s consistent 
unwillingness to acknowledge that foreign aid and development assistance are linked to power 
ambitions results in the following discussion being largely based on critical analysis alone. Indeed, in 
many years of interviewing politicians, civil servants and even volunteers involved in foreign aid from 
a variety of countries, this author has only rarely heard an interviewee admit the power motive of 
the industry.  
One example of such a narrative came from Yen Ming-hong, who, when interviewed in 2013, was 
the Deputy Director for Technical Cooperation at the Taiwan International Cooperation and 
Development Fund (ICDF). He stated the following about his government’s primary concern over the 
health of diplomatic relationships as motive for providing foreign aid. For Yen, Taiwan’s foreign aid 
had previously amounted to an intergovernmental bribe that befitted Taiwan’s international 
priorities at the time. 
In the 1960s the reason why we were involved in international aid was totally a diplomatic 
concern. As you know, we are no longer a member of the United Nations, and during that 
time the Taiwan government tried to keep our allied countries in Africa. So what they came 
up with was to send out a lot of technical missions to stay there and to provide agricultural 
assistance in the hope that we can have their diplomatic support. In that time, we were not 
focused on the results of the projects. We did not care about the results. We just wanted the 
support of the local governments. (Yen, 2013) 
Nevertheless, Yen was adamant that Taiwan’s contemporary intent was more philanthropic. This 
was despite a volume of evidence to the contrary (see Alexander, 2014a and 2015). 
 
The Domestic Audience 
Let us begin this sub-section by reviewing transcripts from the leaders’ debates in the lead up to the 
2017 UK general election. These narratives do much to reveal how political parties in wealthy states 
present the notion of foreign aid to their domestic publics.  
 
Transcript of ITV Leaders Debate 18th May 2017  
Paul Nuttall (PN) (Leader of UK Independence Party): […] We also would put £1.4 billion a 
year into social care. And how would we pay for this? Well we would take that money 
directly from a foreign aid budget that is costing us around £13 billion every single year. We 
would cut that back to 0.2% of GDP, which is exactly the same as it was in the United States 
under Barack Obama. 
--- (later in the debate) --- 
PN: We take that money from the foreign aid budget which is costing us £30 million every 
single day […] 
Leanne Wood (LW) (Leader of Plaid Cymru): Taking it away from refugees then, yeah? 
PN: […] Hang on, hang on. If we reduce foreign aid to 0.2% that is, as I said earlier, the same 
as the United States under Obama, the point is […] 
LW: You’re stopping refugees coming here, preventing them. 
PN: […] this is about low hanging fruit, there’s no need to put up taxation, we can simply take 
it from the foreign aid budget […] 
Nicola Sturgeon (Leader of the Scottish National Party): Take it from the poorest people in 
the world? 
PN: […] supporting British people first. Charity begins at home.  
(ITV, 2017)  
Transcript of BBC Leaders Debate 31st May 2017  
PN: […] we would slash the foreign aid budget that is costing the British people £30 million a 
day. 
[Incoherent commotion] 
Caroline Lucas (Joint Leader of the Green Party): Shame on you! 
(BBC, 2017)  
 
These short transcripts present the political propaganda that foreign aid amounts to a form of state 
charity. Wood, Sturgeon and Lucas, whose parties all occupy the centre or centre-left ground in UK 
politics, do not question the philanthropic guise of foreign aid that the more right-wing Nuttall 
emphasises, and are appalled, genuinely or not, by his apparent lack of compassion. The discussion 
within these debates then, and one that is replicated in political debates in wealthy countries around 
the world, surrounds how much international state charity should be provided, not whether foreign 
aid amounts to a form of philanthropy at all. These narratives form a key part of the public discourse 
that conceives of foreign aid as an act of kindness on the part of government with the primary topic 
of debate how generous the government ought to be on the electorate’s behalf. This nourishes the 
notion of a domestic collective ego concerning a country and its citizens making a positive 
contribution to the planet beyond the consumption of its resources, but which is, in reality, 
motivated by the manufacture of the consent of the domestic public to be ruled.  
 
The Governments of Recipient States 
The second audience of foreign aid that can be discussed are the governments and powerful people 
within recipient states. In the postcolonial era, these individuals and institutions have been 
responsible for ratifying the contracts that the governments of wealthy states and international 
corporations have made to rent and purchase land for a variety of purposes within these countries. 
This quality land then becomes unavailable for use by the publics of recipient states, squeezing them 
either into city slums or onto land that is susceptible to climatic variation and/or not suited to the 
agriculture that it is then asked to produce. This system produces a ready supply of destitute 
communities primed for ‘saving’ by foreign aid and development assistance, while also allowing 
wealthy governments to propagate their moral responsibility to the world’s poor, and providing an 
international outlet for philanthropic, but ultimately misguided, members of their domestic publics. 
To this end, the next time an appeal from a charity or aid agency appears on the television stating 
that someone must walk many kilometres from their home to find fresh water, perhaps it should be 
asked why they live so far from fresh water as this has been the basic premise of all human 
habitation since the birth of organised society.  
Although somewhat limited in its breadth and analysis, Saskia Sassen’s (2014) account of the 
Expulsions of people from land that their families have farmed for generations is a powerful 
argument about the responsibility for the plight of the world’s poor ultimately lying with the rich. 
Sassen also notes that the twenty-first century has seen an intensification of land acquisition with 
two significant factors being the main contributors to this. The first is that the rise in food prices has 
made land an even more desirable investment by international buyers, even for speculative reasons; 
and the second is the growing demand for industrial crops, notably palm for biofuels, and for food 
crops, the latter particularly coming from the rapidly developing states of East Asia and the Middle 
East. The intensive industrialisation of these countries has resulted in additional demands for the 
products that tend to follow economic growth, with greater meat consumption one area of note.  
What Sassen does not discuss, however, is the process by which the governments of wealthy states 
and international corporations engineer elections around the world in an attempt at ensuring that 
the candidates who will provide a preferential treatment of sorts are elected to office. To this end, 
elections in countries where a significant percentage of land is used for export purposes tend to be 
swamped with clandestine foreign monies, which by and large control the menu of political choice 
for the voters. Indeed, even moderately socialist or protectionist groups struggle to start a campaign 
such is their lack of access to the capital needed to compete in a national election resulting in some 
turning to violence. This is before consideration is given to the communications professionals who 
join the teams of preferred candidates to structure the delivery of campaign messages, and 
researchers who ‘muckrake’ candidates less favourable to the priorities of international interests, 
attempting to find any kind of underhand dealing or personal demon. As such, foreign aid in this 
context is used as an attractive political incentive committed by wealthy states and international 
corporations to their preferred candidates in recipient states as part of an exchange package that 
essentially limits the role of the government of poorer states to the welfare of its citizens and largely 
thwarts any movement towards them achieving social justice within the international system. The 
governments of these states, and those close to power, thus form one of the key audiences of 
foreign aid under soft power analysis.   
 
Other International Audiences 
This subsection is formed of a variety of groups and clusters who may have contact with, or become 
aware of, a government’s contribution to the foreign aid industries and who may then make positive 
value judgments about that contribution and its source. It includes international political, economic 
and societal groups that a source government conceives of and wants to appeal to as part of their 
broader strategic international ambitions. The most important of these is the United Nations as this 
is the primary fora for the debate of global governmental legislation and the international platform 
for the articulation of the prevailing values of the world system and the policies and positions that 
follow from them. Other international political groups that source governments regularly attempt to 
attract include the World Health Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the European Union, and a variety of regional military alliances.  
At the crux of this process of manufacturing attractiveness through foreign aid is a desire to 
demonstrate conformity with perceived international norms of responsible or dutiful behaviour as 
have been determined to befit the power status of the source. This process does not necessarily 
exist on a platform of morality but moral obligation may form part of the propaganda here. Perhaps 
the most prominent articulation of this ambition comes from separatist regional governments of 
wealthy states, who, in a bid to demonstrate congruence with prevailing values and consensus on 
global issues, engage in small amounts of foreign aid as part of what is known as ‘protodiplomacy’. 
By engaging in protodiplomacy these regional governments are implicitly confirming that in the 
event of their independence from the parent state they would become consistent, regular and 
reliable members of the so-called international community as their power status would determine. A 
strong recent example of this has been the Scottish government, which has used foreign aid and 
development assistance as part of its pro-independence international communications strategy and 
charm offensive towards major international governmental organisations (see Alexander, 2014b). 
However, this is a regular activity of all state governments engaged in aid provision as they all 
articulate their contribution to the industry as part of their political communications towards a host 
of international audiences beyond the immediate recipients of foreign aid. Indeed, some 
governments may have reservations about the manner in which aid operates, concerns over 
corruption for example, but will nevertheless continue to engage in the practice in some form as it 
assists their power ambitions and prevents any negative attention being drawn to themselves lest 
they be labelled as some kind of foreign aid ‘scrooge’ by those they seek to influence. 
 
Recipients of Aid and Assistance 
The final audience that requires discussion are those in receipt of an aid package or development 
programme. Often the receipt of aid or assistance is recognition of some form of capital or 
usefulness within the priorities of the world system. Beyond this, those facing a nadir of destitution, 
with seemingly minimal capital, may become recipients because of the so-called ‘CNN effect’, where 
the international mainstream news media shine a light on suffering, and, if certain criteria are met, 
successfully pressurise governments to act (see Robinson, 2002). Linking more to the domestic 
audience within donor states, this may also present as a form of so-called ‘poverty porn’, wherein 
media viewers watch images of suffering as a form of fetish that they subconsciously do not want to 
see eradicated for it excites them, makes them feel good about themselves or presents them with a 
guilt narrative that can be conveniently alleviated by charity donation or endorsement of 
government programmes (see Zizek, 2009). The notions of jouissance and schadenfreude are 
noteworthy here. Finally, the foreign aid industries require a regular supply of ‘success’ stories as 
part of their propaganda that it can make a positive impact on reducing global poverty and capacity 
building.  
 
Conclusion 
Foreign aid and development assistance are very motivated by the source’s power imperative. To 
this end, these industries ought to be thought of as public diplomacy outputs aimed at the 
generation of power for the source government in the form of attractiveness rather than power as a 
result of coercion or persuasion. Foreign aid’s lack of regular inclusion within the portfolio of 
ministers assigned to public diplomacy is synonymous with the fictional demarcation of government 
departments and a likely attempt by government to prevent the growth of a sense of hypocrisy 
within their own publics over the international role of those who govern them. This is primarily 
because public diplomacy tends to be thought of as a communications arm of regular state foreign 
policy rather than any form of philanthropy. As such, while ministries of foreign affairs are 
concerned with the consolidation or accumulation of the power status of the source, departments of 
international development operate separately under the pretence of being motivated by power 
dispersal. They are not, however, and this demarcation represents part of the Orwellian 
misconstruction of government. 
To conclude then, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that foreign aid is conducted for 
purposes beyond that of philanthropy despite much of its propaganda narrative indicating 
philanthropic intentions. One of the most significant factors behind this is because the modern 
corporate state is increasingly run like a business that is power and capital hungry. To this end, 
governments employ spin doctors, undertake branding initiatives, perform ‘reputation management’ 
and are increasingly subservient to corporate industry rather than the people to which they remain 
accountable (at least within democracies). Why then should departments of international 
development be any less ‘spun’, so to speak? What is more, calls for transparency mean the 
publication of accounts, much like a public limited company, and subsequent scrutiny and 
justification of expenditure by the domestic public and media. Therefore, it follows that the funding 
of foreign aid must be in line with the economic and political interests of the source, if the 
government is to avoid accusations of financial mismanagement or squandering of public funds. 
Indeed, public diplomacy has had a long and arduous battle with government finance because its 
results are essentially unquantifiable such is the solipsistic nature of its activities. Thus, while 
outright plunder cannot occur as it did in colonial times, the ideologically constructed ‘benefit’ that 
foreign aid has for any recipient remains utterly subordinate to the source’s self-interests.  
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